APT Database

Major threat actor profiles β€” click any card to expand

Notable Campaigns & Operations

Significant cyber operations and their analysis

Major Campaign Timeline

Dec 2020 β€” Discovered
SolarWinds / SUNBURST (APT29 / Cozy Bear)
Supply chain compromise of SolarWinds Orion. Trojanized update (SUNBURST) deployed to ~18,000 orgs. TEARDROP & RAINDROP secondary payloads. Targeted US government agencies and major technology/security vendors. Demonstrated advanced OPSEC: DGA C2, steganography, SAML token forging (GoldenSAML).
2021 β€” Ongoing
Hafnium / ProxyLogon & ProxyShell (HAFNIUM)
Multiple Exchange Server zero-day chains. ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855 + CVE-2021-27065): SSRF β†’ arbitrary file write β†’ webshell. ProxyShell: Pre-auth RCE chain. Exploited by multiple Chinese APTs, then rapidly adopted by ransomware operators. Mass exploitation event.
2022
Ukraine Wiper Campaigns (Sandworm / Voodoo Bear)
Series of destructive wiper malware: WhisperGate, HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, CaddyWiper, Industroyer2. Timed with kinetic military operations. Industroyer2 targeted Ukrainian power grid (ICS/SCADA). Combination of wipers, ransomware decoys, and supply chain compromise.
2023
Volt Typhoon β€” Living off the Land (China)
Chinese state actor targeting US critical infrastructure. Minimal malware β€” extensive use of LOLBins (ntdsutil, netsh, PowerShell). Long-term access to telecom, energy, water sectors. Focus on pre-positioning for potential conflict scenarios. Heavy use of compromised SOHO routers as ORBs (operational relay boxes).
2023
Storm-0558 β€” Cloud Token Compromise
Chinese threat actor obtained a consumer signing key from a major cloud provider. Forged identity tokens to access email of ~25 organizations including US government. Exploited validation flaw accepting consumer keys for enterprise tenants. Led to a major provider security overhaul.
2023-2024
Midnight Blizzard β€” Corporate Cloud Compromise (APT29)
Password spray against legacy non-MFA test tenant. Pivoted via OAuth app to access executive email. Exfiltrated source code repositories. Attempted to use stolen secrets for further access. Demonstrated risk of legacy configurations and OAuth app abuse.
2024
Salt Typhoon β€” Telecom Infiltration (China)
Massive compromise of US telecom providers (AT&T, Verizon, others). Accessed lawful intercept systems and call metadata. Targeted specific government officials' communications. Long-duration access measured in months. One of the largest telecom espionage operations ever disclosed.
2024-2025
Scattered Spider / Octo Tempest β€” Social Engineering
English-speaking threat actors using advanced social engineering. SIM swapping, helpdesk manipulation, MFA fatigue. Targeted major enterprises (MGM, Caesars, others). Combined social engineering with technical sophistication. Affiliate model with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.

Campaign Analysis Template

Structured Campaign Report Format
Campaign Analysis Report
═══════════════════════
Campaign Name:     [Name / Operation codename]
Attribution:       [APT group / Confidence level (low/medium/high)]
Timeframe:         [First observed β€” Last observed]
Motivation:        [Espionage / Destruction / Financial / Hacktivism]
Target Profile:    [Sectors, geographies, specific orgs]

Kill Chain Mapping:
  Recon:           [Methods: OSINT, scanning, social media]
  Weaponization:   [Malware used, exploits leveraged]
  Delivery:        [Spearphish, watering hole, supply chain]
  Exploitation:    [CVEs, zero-days, social engineering]
  Installation:    [Persistence mechanisms]
  C2:              [Infrastructure, protocols, evasion]
  Actions:         [Data exfil, destruction, lateral movement]

Diamond Model:
  Adversary:       [Group, sub-group, operators]
  Capability:      [Tools, malware, exploits]
  Infrastructure:  [Domains, IPs, certificates]
  Victim:          [Target characterization]

IOCs:              [Hashes, domains, IPs, YARA rules]
MITRE Mapping:     [Technique IDs with context]
Detection:         [Sigma rules, KQL queries, behavioral indicators]
Recommendations:  [Defensive actions, hunting queries]

Diamond Model Analysis

Structured intrusion analysis using the Diamond Model

The Diamond Model

β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ ADVERSARY β”‚ β”‚ Who is the β”‚ β”‚ threat actorβ”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ Social-Political β”‚ (motivation, targeting) β”‚ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ CAPABILITY β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ INFRASTRUC- β”‚ β”‚ Tools, TTPs,│───────┼───────│ TURE β”‚ β”‚ malware, β”‚ Technical β”‚ Domains,IPs,β”‚ β”‚ exploits β”‚ Axis β”‚ certs, C2 β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ β”‚ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”΄β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ VICTIM β”‚ β”‚ Target org, β”‚ β”‚ persona, β”‚ β”‚ vulnerab. β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ Axes: ═ Technical Axis: Capability ←→ Infrastructure (tools connect to infra) β•‘ Social-Political: Adversary ←→ Victim (motivation drives targeting) Meta-Features: β€’ Timestamp β€” When did each event occur? β€’ Phase β€” Kill chain phase β€’ Result β€” Success/failure/unknown β€’ Direction β€” Adversaryβ†’Victim, Victimβ†’Adversary, Bidirectional β€’ Methodology β€” General class of activity β€’ Resources β€” What was required (cost, skill, time)

Diamond Model β€” Pivot Analysis

Starting PointPivot ToMethodExample
Infrastructure (IP)Other victimsPassive DNS, scan dataSame C2 IP seen targeting multiple orgs
Infrastructure (domain)Adversary infraWHOIS, registrar patternsSame registrant email across domains
Capability (malware hash)InfrastructureSandbox C2 extractionMalware config reveals C2 domains
Capability (malware family)AdversaryCode similarity, TTPsShared codebase links campaigns
Victim (sector)Adversary intentTargeting analysisDefense sector β†’ nation-state espionage
Adversary (known group)Future targetsHistorical targetingAPT28 historically targets NATO
Infrastructure (cert)Related infraCertificate transparencySame self-signed cert across IPs
Capability (exploit)Adversary tierCapability assessmentZero-day use β†’ well-resourced actor

Activity Grouping & Clustering

Activity Thread:
  A sequence of events linked by at least one shared Diamond vertex.
  Thread = Event₁ β†’ Eventβ‚‚ β†’ Event₃ ... (shared adversary, infra, or capability)

Activity Group:
  Cluster of activity threads with shared features.
  Used for campaign-level analysis and actor tracking.

Clustering Approaches:

Adversary-Centric Grouping:
  Group all activities attributed to same actor
  Risk: Attribution errors cascade across entire group
  Use: When attribution confidence is high

Capability-Centric Grouping:
  Group by shared tools/malware/techniques
  Risk: Tools can be shared, sold, or false-flagged
  Use: When unique custom tooling is observed

Infrastructure-Centric Grouping:
  Group by shared C2, hosting, domains
  Risk: Shared hosting, bulletproof hosts used by multiple actors
  Use: When infrastructure is unique/custom

Victim-Centric Grouping:
  Group by common targeting patterns
  Risk: Multiple actors target same sectors
  Use: When defending specific sector/org

TTP Mapping & Trends

MITRE ATT&CK mapping patterns across APT groups

Most Common APT Techniques (2023-2025)

TechniqueATT&CK IDUsed ByTrend
Phishing: Spearphishing AttachmentT1566.001Nearly all APTsEvolving (QR codes, OneNote, HTML smuggling)
Exploitation of Public-Facing AppT1190Volt Typhoon, HAFNIUM, multiple↑ Increasing (VPN/firewall zero-days)
Valid AccountsT1078APT29, Storm-0558, Scattered Spider↑ Major trend (credential theft, token forging)
Command & Scripting InterpreterT1059Most APTs→ Stable (PowerShell, cmd, Python)
OS Credential DumpingT1003APT28, APT29, Lazarus→ Evolving (LSASS alternatives)
Proxy: External Proxy / ORBsT1090.002Chinese APTs (Volt/Salt Typhoon)↑ Major trend (compromised routers)
Ingress Tool TransferT1105Most APTs→ Stable
Remote Services (RDP, SSH, SMB)T1021Most APTs→ Stable
Impair Defenses: Disable ToolsT1562.001Sandworm, ransomware actors↑ BYOVD trend (bring vulnerable driver)
Data from Cloud StorageT1530APT29, Storm-0558↑ Cloud focus

Emerging TTP Trends

Living-off-the-Land (LOTL)

Nation-state actors increasingly avoid custom malware in favor of built-in OS tools.

LOLBinAbuse
ntdsutil.exeAD database (NTDS.dit) extraction
netsh.exePort forwarding, firewall changes
certutil.exeDownload files, encode/decode
wmic.exeRecon, lateral movement
PowerShellEverything (encoded commands)
reg.exeSAM/SECURITY hive export
Edge Device Exploitation

VPN appliances, firewalls, and routers are prime initial access targets.

TargetExample CVEs
Ivanti/Pulse Secure VPNCVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887
Fortinet FortiGateCVE-2022-42475, CVE-2023-27997
Citrix NetScalerCVE-2023-3519 (CitrixBleed)
Palo Alto PAN-OSCVE-2024-3400
SOHO RoutersUsed as ORB infrastructure

TTP Comparison: Russia vs China vs DPRK vs Iran

AspectRussia (SVR/GRU)China (MSS/PLA)DPRK (RGB)Iran (MOIS/IRGC)
Primary GoalEspionage + DisruptionEspionage + IP Theft + Pre-positioningFinancial Theft + EspionageEspionage + Retaliation
Initial AccessSpearphish, supply chain, cred theftN-day exploits, edge devices, LOTLSocial engineering, supply chain, cryptoSpearphish, web exploits, VPN exploits
StealthVery high (APT29), moderate (APT28)Very high (Volt Typhoon LOTL)Moderate (improving)Moderate
Custom ToolingExtensive (SUNBURST, custom implants)Mix (some custom, heavy LOTL)Custom (BLINDINGCAN, AppleJeus)Moderate (MuddyC2Go, custom)
DestructiveYes (Sandworm wipers)Rare (pre-positioning focus)Occasionally (DarkSeoul)Yes (Shamoon, wipers)
Cloud FocusHigh (token forging, OAuth)Growing (Storm-0558)ModerateGrowing

IOC Analysis Framework

Indicator processing, enrichment, and correlation

Pyramid of Pain

β•±β•² β•± β•² TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures) β•± TOUGH β•² ← Hardest for adversary to change ╱──────────╲ Detection = behavioral, highest value β•± β•² β•± Challenging β•² Tools (malware families, custom tools) ╱────────────────╲ ← Requires retooling β•± β•² β•± Annoying β•² Network/Host Artifacts ╱──────────────────────╲ (URI patterns, C2 protocols, mutexes) β•± β•² β•± Simple β•² Domain Names ╱────────────────────────────╲ ← Easy to register new ones β•± β•² β•± Easy β•² IP Addresses ╱──────────────────────────────────╲ ← Trivial to change β•± β•² β•± Trivial β•² Hash Values (file hashes) ╱────────────────────────────────────────╲ ← One-bit change = new hash ╱──────────────────────────────────────────╲ Investment strategy: Focus detection at TOP of pyramid IOC feeds give you the bottom; behavioral detection gives you the top.

IOC Types & Analysis

IOC TypeSourcesEnrichmentShelf Life
File Hashes (MD5/SHA256)Sandbox, AV, IRVT, MalwareBazaar, YARA matchHours-Days (recompile)
IP AddressesNetwork logs, sandboxWhois, ASN, geolocation, reputationHours-Weeks
DomainsDNS logs, sandbox, CT logsWHOIS, pDNS, registration patternsDays-Months
URLsProxy logs, email headersURL reputation, content analysisHours-Days
Email AddressesPhishing analysisBreach databases, OSINTWeeks-Months
SSL CertificatesCT logs, scanningSubject, issuer, serial patternsMonths (until revoked)
YARA RulesMalware analysisRetrohunt, file scanningMonths-Years (behavioral)
Behavioral (TTPs)IR, threat researchATT&CK mapping, detection rulesMonths-Years

IOC Enrichment Workflow

# Automated IOC enrichment pipeline

1. Ingest: Receive IOC (hash, IP, domain, URL)
    β”‚
2. Validate: Format check, defang, dedup
    β”‚  └── Strip [.] β†’ ., hxxp β†’ http, etc.
    β”‚
3. Classify: Determine IOC type
    β”‚  └── Hash (MD5/SHA1/SHA256), IPv4/v6, FQDN, URL, Email
    β”‚
4. Enrich: Query multiple sources
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ VirusTotal (detections, relationships, behavior)
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Passive DNS (domain ↔ IP history)
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ WHOIS (registration, registrant)
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Shodan/Censys (open ports, services, certs)
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Threat intel feeds (known bad, campaigns)
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ GeoIP (location, ASN, ISP)
    β”‚  └── Internal telemetry (seen in our environment?)
    β”‚
5. Correlate: Link related IOCs
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Same infrastructure cluster?
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Same malware family?
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Same campaign / threat actor?
    β”‚  └── Diamond Model vertex alignment
    β”‚
6. Score: Confidence + Severity
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ How many sources confirm?
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ How fresh is the IOC?
    β”‚  β”œβ”€β”€ Context (targeted vs commodity)?
    β”‚  └── Relevance to our environment?
    β”‚
7. Action: Block, Alert, Hunt, or Monitor
    └── Deploy to detection systems (SIEM, EDR, firewall)

STIX/TAXII Intelligence Sharing

STIX 2.1 Domain Objects
ObjectPurposeKey Fields
Attack PatternTTP descriptionATT&CK technique mapping
CampaignNamed operationFirst/last seen, objectives
IndicatorObservable IOCPattern (STIX patterning), valid_from/until
Intrusion SetThreat actor groupingAliases, goals, resource_level
MalwareMalware instanceMalware types, capabilities, architecture
Threat ActorIndividual/groupRoles, sophistication, motivation
ToolLegitimate/dual-useTool types (info-gathering, credential-exploitation)
VulnerabilityCVE referenceCVE ID, description
RelationshipLinks objectsUses, targets, attributed-to, indicates

Attribution Methodology

Linking cyber operations to threat actors with appropriate confidence

Attribution Evidence Layers

Layer 5: Geopolitical Context [Lowest confidence alone] └── Motivation alignment, timing with events, targeting patterns "Who benefits? Does timing align with geopolitical events?" Layer 4: Organizational Behavior └── Working hours (timezone), language artifacts, operational tempo "9-5 Beijing time? Mandarin compiler? Holiday patterns?" Layer 3: Campaign & Infrastructure Patterns └── Domain registration, hosting providers, C2 patterns, reuse "Same registrant? Same bulletproof host? Same C2 protocol?" Layer 2: Malware & Tool Analysis └── Code similarity, shared libraries, unique artifacts, PDB paths "Same codebase? Same build environment? Unique encryption?" Layer 1: Forensic Evidence [Highest confidence alone] └── OPSEC failures, metadata, direct evidence "Left debug symbols? Logged into personal account? VPN leaked?" ╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗ β•‘ STRONG attribution requires MULTIPLE layers of evidence. β•‘ β•‘ Single-layer attribution is EASILY manipulated (false flag). β•‘ β•šβ•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•β•

False Flag Indicators

False Flag TechniqueExampleHow to Detect
Planted language artifactsOlympic Destroyer (Russian ops planted DPRK code)Inconsistency with other evidence layers
Reused known APT toolsUsing leaked Equation Group toolsTool alone β‰  attribution (tools get shared/leaked)
Fake WHOIS dataRegistration mimicking known actor patternsCross-reference with passive DNS history
Timezone manipulationSetting compile times to wrong timezoneLook for inconsistencies across artifacts
Metadata plantingInserting specific usernames or pathsCompare with behavioral and infrastructure evidence

Confidence Assessment Framework

LevelMeaningEvidence RequiredLanguage
HighAttribution is well-establishedMultiple independent layers, corroborated by multiple sources"We assess with high confidence that..."
ModerateAttribution is credibly supportedMultiple evidence types, some gaps"We assess with moderate confidence that..."
LowAttribution is plausible but uncertainLimited evidence, single source or layer"We assess with low confidence that..."
UnattributedInsufficient evidenceInsufficient evidence for any attribution"The activity remains unattributed..."

Malware Family Tracker

Major malware families used by APT groups

APT Malware Arsenal

MalwareTypeAPT GroupKey Capabilities
SUNBURSTBackdoorAPT29 (Cozy Bear)Supply chain trojan, DGA C2, steganography, anti-analysis
Cobalt Strike BeaconRAT/C2Multiple (also eCrime)HTTP/HTTPS/DNS C2, BOFs, malleable profiles, memory-only
CHOPSTICK / X-AgentModular backdoorAPT28 (Fancy Bear)Keylogging, file theft, screenshot, modular plugins
PlugX / ShadowPadRATMultiple Chinese APTsDLL sideloading, modular, shared across Chinese groups
Industroyer / CrashOverrideICS malwareSandwormICS protocol manipulation (IEC 104, OPC DA), grid disruption
BLINDINGCAN / DRATzarusRATLazarus GroupFull RAT capabilities, defense/aerospace targeting
AppleJeusTrojanLazarus GroupFake crypto trading apps, macOS + Windows
Shamoon / DisttrackWiperAPT33 (Iran)MBR wipe, file destruction, used against Saudi Aramco
BlackCat/ALPHVRansomwareeCrime (affiliates)Rust-based, cross-platform, triple extortion
BPFDoorBackdoorRed Menshen (China)BPF-based passive backdoor, evades firewalls
MuddyC2GoC2 FrameworkMuddyWater (Iran)Golang C2, PowerShell payloads
PIPEDREAM / INCONTROLLERICS frameworkLikely state-sponsoredMulti-ICS protocol, Schneider/Omron targeting

Malware Analysis Indicators for Attribution

Code-Level Indicators:
  β€’ PDB paths        β†’ Developer environment, username, project names
  β€’ Compiler         β†’ MSVC version, GCC, Clang, Delphi, Go, Rust
  β€’ Build timestamps β†’ Timezone inference (if not zeroed/faked)
  β€’ String artifacts β†’ Language, debug messages, error handling
  β€’ Code reuse       β†’ Shared libraries, copy-paste between families
  β€’ Crypto constants β†’ Custom vs standard implementations
  β€’ Mutex names      β†’ Campaign identifiers, versioning

Behavioral Indicators:
  β€’ C2 protocol      β†’ Custom vs standard, beacon patterns
  β€’ Sleep patterns   β†’ Jitter, business hours awareness
  β€’ Anti-analysis    β†’ Specific VM/sandbox checks
  β€’ Persistence      β†’ Registry keys, services, scheduled tasks
  β€’ Collection       β†’ What data is targeted, staging methods
  β€’ Exfil methods    β†’ Encrypted, steganography, legitimate services

Infrastructure Patterns

C2 infrastructure analysis and tracking

Operational Relay Box (ORB) Networks

Adversary Operator β”‚ β–Ό β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ VPN / Tor β”‚ Layer 1: Anonymization β”‚ Entry Point β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ β–Ό β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ Compromised β”‚ Layer 2: ORB Network β”‚ SOHO Routers β”‚ (residential IPs, hard to block) β”‚ (TP-Link,ASUS) β”‚ Hundreds of nodes, rotating β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ β–Ό β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ Relay / Proxy β”‚ Layer 3: Relay Infrastructure β”‚ (Cloud VPS) β”‚ Leased servers, bulletproof hosting β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ β–Ό β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ C2 Server β”‚ Layer 4: Command & Control β”‚ (Domain frontedβ”‚ Legitimate-looking domains β”‚ or legitimate β”‚ CDN abuse, cloud service abuse β”‚ service) β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ β–Ό Victim Network Volt Typhoon model: SOHO router botnets as ORBs Traffic appears as residential IP β†’ very hard to detect/block

Infrastructure Tracking Techniques

TechniqueTool/SourceWhat You Find
Passive DNSFarsight DNSDB, RiskIQ, SecurityTrailsHistorical domain↔IP mappings, DNS changes
Certificate Transparencycrt.sh, Censys, CT logsSSL certs issued, domain associations
WHOIS AnalysisDomainTools, WHOISRegistrant patterns, registration dates, privacy services
Port ScanningShodan, Censys, ZoomEyeOpen ports, services, banners, TLS configs
JARM/JA3 FingerprintingShodan, custom scanningTLS implementation fingerprints for C2 identification
HTTP Response HashingShodan favicon hash, HTML body hashUnique server configurations across IPs
ASN AnalysisBGP data, ASN lookupsHosting patterns, bulletproof providers
Domain Generation AlgorithmDGA detection toolsPredicted future C2 domains

C2 Framework Fingerprinting

FrameworkDefault IndicatorsJARM Hash (Default)
Cobalt Strikechecksum8 URI, x86/x64 stager, default cert07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1
MetasploitDefault URI patterns, Meterpreter beacon07d14d16d21d21d00042d41d00041de5fb3038104f457d92ba02e9311512c2
SlivermTLS, HTTP(S), DNS, WireGuardVaries (Go TLS implementation)
Brute RatelDOH C2, sleep obfuscationVaries (customizable)
HavocHTTPS, SMB named pipesNewer, less signature coverage

Collection & Sources

Intelligence sources for threat research

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Sources

CategorySourceWhat You Get
Malware AnalysisVirusTotal, MalwareBazaar, Hybrid Analysis, ANY.RUNSamples, detections, behavior, relationships
Threat ReportsVendor blogs (MS, Mandiant, CrowdStrike, ESET, Recorded Future)Campaign analysis, IOCs, TTPs
IOC FeedsAlienVault OTX, Abuse.ch, OpenCTI, MISPCommunity IOC sharing
Vulnerability IntelNVD, CVE, CISA KEV, Exploit-DBCVE details, exploit availability, EPSS
InfrastructureShodan, Censys, Farsight DNSDB, crt.shInternet scanning, passive DNS, certificates
Code/LeaksGitHub, Pastebin monitoringLeaked tools, credentials, configs
Dark WebDark web monitoring servicesActor communications, sales, leaks
GovernmentCISA Advisories, FBI Flash, NSA CSAs, Five EyesOfficial attribution, defensive guidance

Intelligence Cycle for APT Tracking

1. Direction / Requirements
   └── What APT groups target our sector?
       What TTPs are trending? What's our coverage gap?

2. Collection
   └── Monitor feeds, vendor reports, OSINT sources
       Track infrastructure changes, new malware samples
       Internal telemetry (EDR, SIEM, network sensors)

3. Processing
   └── Normalize IOCs, extract metadata
       Map to MITRE ATT&CK, enrich indicators
       Dedup, validate, timestamp

4. Analysis
   └── Cluster activities β†’ campaigns β†’ actors
       Diamond Model analysis for each intrusion set
       Identify trends, predict future operations

5. Dissemination
   └── Strategic intel β†’ leadership (threat landscape)
       Operational intel β†’ security teams (campaigns)
       Tactical intel β†’ SOC/IR (IOCs, detection rules)

6. Feedback
   └── Were detections effective?
       Did hunting queries find anything?
       Adjust collection priorities

Threat Actor Naming Crosswalk

Weather-themed actor names and common cross-references

Weather-Themed Naming Convention

Some vendor taxonomies use weather-themed names based on nation-state affiliation or activity clusters. "Storm-XXXX" style names often designate developing clusters not yet attributed to a known group.
Weather ThemeNation/MotivationExamples
Blizzard ❄️RussiaMidnight Blizzard (APT29), Forest Blizzard (APT28), Seashell Blizzard (Sandworm)
Typhoon πŸŒ€ChinaVolt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon, Silk Typhoon (HAFNIUM), Flax Typhoon
Sandstorm 🏜️IranMango Sandstorm (APT35), Mint Sandstorm (APT35), Peach Sandstorm (APT33)
Sleet 🌧️North KoreaDiamond Sleet (Lazarus), Jade Sleet, Citrine Sleet, Ruby Sleet
Tempest πŸŒͺ️eCrime / FinancialOcto Tempest (Scattered Spider), Manatee Tempest, Pistachio Tempest
Tsunami 🌊Private Sector OffensiveCommercial surveillance vendors
Storm-XXXX β›ˆοΈDeveloping / UnattributedStorm-0558, Storm-0501, Storm-1567
Flood 🌊Influence OperationsInformation operations, disinformation

Key Tracked Actors β€” Cross-Reference

Weather-Themed NameOther NamesNationNotable Activity
Midnight BlizzardAPT29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes, NOBELIUMRussia (SVR)SolarWinds, major cloud provider breach, diplomatic espionage
Forest BlizzardAPT28, Fancy Bear, Strontium, SofacyRussia (GRU 26165)Election interference, NATO targeting, Olympic Destroyer
Seashell BlizzardSandworm, Voodoo Bear, IRIDIUMRussia (GRU 74455)NotPetya, Ukraine wipers, Industroyer, power grid attacks
Volt TyphoonBRONZE SILHOUETTE, Insidious TaurusChinaUS critical infrastructure LOTL, pre-positioning
Salt TyphoonGhostEmperor, FamousSparrowChinaTelecom infiltration, lawful intercept access
Silk TyphoonHAFNIUMChinaExchange Server exploitation (ProxyLogon)
Diamond SleetLazarus Group, ZINC, Hidden CobraDPRK (RGB)Crypto theft, defense industry, supply chain
Citrine SleetAppleJeus operatorDPRKCryptocurrency targeting, fake trading platforms
Mint SandstormAPT35, Charming Kitten, PhosphorusIran (IRGC)Academic/research targeting, credential theft
Peach SandstormAPT33, Elfin, Refined KittenIranDefense/energy targeting, Shamoon association
Octo TempestScattered Spider, 0ktapus, UNC3944eCrimeSocial engineering, SIM swap, MFA fatigue, ALPHV affiliate

Threat Intelligence API Reference

Threat intelligence enrichment patterns for R&D workflows

Threat Intelligence Capabilities

FeatureDescriptionR&D Application
Threat ArticlesVendor-authored threat intel reportsStay current on campaigns, validate findings
Intel ProfilesDetailed actor/tool/vulnerability profilesReference during campaign analysis
Indicator SearchEnrich IOCs with vendor telemetry and open-source dataValidate IOCs, find related infrastructure
Data SetsPassive DNS, WHOIS, certificates, trackers, componentsInfrastructure mapping, pivot analysis
Reputation ScoringIP/domain reputation based on telemetry and intelligence sourcesPrioritize investigation targets
Attack SurfaceExternal-facing asset discoveryIdentify exposure, validate vulnerabilities

Threat Intel API Example

# Query a threat intelligence API for indicator enrichment
# Example: Graph Security threat intelligence endpoints

# Get threat intelligence article
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/articles/{articleId}

# Search indicators
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/hosts/{hostName}

# Passive DNS for a host
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/hosts/{hostName}/passivedns

# WHOIS record
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/hosts/{hostName}/whois

# Reputation
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/hosts/{hostName}/reputation

# Components (web technologies)
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/hosts/{hostName}/components

# SSL Certificates
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/security/threatIntelligence/hosts/{hostName}/sslCertificates

KQL Hunting Queries for APT Activity

SIEM / EDR Advanced Hunting
// Detect Volt Typhoon LOTL techniques
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("ntdsutil.exe", "netsh.exe", "certutil.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ifconfig", "portproxy", "urlcache", "activate instance ntds")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

// Detect token forging / Golden SAML patterns
AADSignInEventsBeta
| where ErrorCode == 0
| where isnotempty(TokenIssuerName) and TokenIssuerType != "AzureAD"
| where TokenIssuerName !startswith "https://sts.windows.net"
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, TokenIssuerName

// Detect suspicious OAuth app activity (Storm-0558 style)
CloudAppEvents
| where ActionType == "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant"
   or ActionType == "Consent to application"
| where RawEventData has "ReadWrite.All" or RawEventData has "full_access_as_app"
| project Timestamp, AccountDisplayName, ActionType, Application

// Detect SOHO router C2 beaconing (ORB detection)
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), DistinctPorts=dcount(RemotePort) by RemoteIP, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where ConnectionCount > 20 and DistinctPorts == 1  // Regular beaconing pattern
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceNetworkEvents | summarize by RemoteIP
    | where RemoteIP matches regex @"^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)" == false
) on RemoteIP